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Import of textile product which keeps getting higher 
has caused serious injury to the domestic textile 
industry, as an effort to protect domestic industry 
government has imposed additional import duty in 
form of safeguard duty for import of textiles product. 
The introduction of safeguard duty is expected to 
allow domestic industry to adjust itself for 
competing with import products, but the 
establishment of safeguard duty for the textile 
products is thought to be the trigger for tax evasion 
on the import of textile products, against this 
violation government impose the administrative 
sanction. The purpose of this research is to analyze 
the effect of safeguard duty imposition and 
administration sanctions on tax evasion. The object 
of this research is all import activity on textiles 
product which has been imposed safeguard duty and 
committing administrative violation since the 
establishment of safeguard duty for textile product 
beginning on November 2019 till October 2020. The 
regression technique used is ordinary least square 
regression to regress cross-section data. Research 
conclusion finds that safeguard duty introduction 
significantly affecting tax evasion while 
administrative sanction didn’t have a significant 
effect on reducing tax evasion. 
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Trade liberalization has proven to be 
able to stimulate industrialization that 
spurs economic growth, this can be seen 
from the history of rapid economic growth 
such as in China, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea 
which cannot be separated from the 
existence of trade cooperation with other 
countries Rachmawati & Indrasari 
(2017). Although trade liberalization also 
has a negative impact, namely the free 
trade agreement (FTA) which results in 
the elimination of import duties so that tax 
revenues are reduced and there is a 
tendency to increase in import activities, 
an increase in the volume of imports will 
be a threat to domestic industries. Santos-
Paulino (2002) proves that the elimination 
of trade barriers in the form of import 
duties has a positive correlation with an 
increase in import volume. Furthermore, 
Nambiar et al. (1999) stated that if these 
imported goods compete directly with 
domestically produced goods, a surge in 
imports could endanger domestic 
industries. 
The high demographic figure of 
Indonesia and the existence of the Asean-
China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) 
trade agreement certainly make the 
Indonesian market very attractive to 
China. China became the largest supplier 
of fabrics and fabric products in Indonesia 
in 2018 with a market share of 67.86% 
and followed by Korea with 
11.07%. Throughout the 2016-2019 
period there has been a very sharp spike in 
imports of fabric products. In the table 
presented from 2016-2018 the increase in 
imports of fabric products was 22.54% in 
the 2016-2017 period and jumped sharply 
to 41.76% in the 2017-2018 period, for the 
January-June 2018-2019 period or during 
the first 6 months of the year 2018-2019 
the increase was also seen from 182,541 
tons to 211,112 tons. 
 
Source: (BPS dalam KPPI, 2019) 
On average, the increase in imports 
reached 31.80% per year. Imports of 
fabric products are thought to be very 
strong causing losses to the domestic 
industry, especially since the fabric and 
fabric products industry is the industrial 
sector that absorbs the most labor when 
compared to other manufacturing industry 
sectors (BPS, 2017) so that the closure of 
the domestic textile industry will have an 
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impact. serious to the reduction 
of fieldwork in Indonesia. 
In order to overcome this, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has provided 
provisions regulating the protection of 
domestic industries, namely 
through safeguard measures stipulated in 
the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT) Article XIX. This 
provision provides an opportunity for 
export destination countries to take 
precautionary measures against a surge in 
imports to their country if the import is 
proven to cause serious losses to domestic 
industry (WTO, 1968). The provisions of 
the WTO are adopted into Indonesian 
legislation through Law Number 7 of 
1994 concerning Ratification of the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO and are 
further regulated in Government 
Regulation No. 34 of 2011 concerning 
Antidumping Measures, Compensation 
Measures, and Trade Safeguard 
Measures. With the adoption of the WTO 
provisions, if the interested parties feel 
that they have been affected by serious 
losses due to the surge in imports, they can 
submit a request for an investigation to the 
Indonesian Trade Safeguard Commission 
which is under the Ministry of Trade. 
The KPPI investigation then proved 
that it was true that there had been serious 
losses to the domestic industry as a result 
of the surge in imports (KPPI, 2020). For 
this, KPPI recommends the imposition of 
Safeguard Measure Import Duty (BMTP) 
on imported fabric products for 2 years 
and followed up by the Ministry of 
Finance by issuing PMK No. 
162/010/2020 concerning Imposing 
Safeguard Measures Import Duty on 
Imported Fabrics. 
The imposition of BMTP is an 
exception to the general import 
duty (most favored nation) so that if it is 
included in the trade agreement (FTA) 
scheme, BMTP is an additional 
preferential import duty, this additional 
import duty generally depends on the 
quantity and type of fabric imported at the 
lowest rate. is IDR 1,318 / meter and the 
highest is IDR 11,426 / meter. 
The enactment of the imposition of 
BMTP on fabric products certainly makes 
the price of imported fabric products soar, 
the hope is that the domestic industry will 
have the opportunity to adjust structurally 
so that when the imposition of BMTP 
ends the domestic industry can compete 
with imported goods. 
Violations of customs provisions in 
the import of fabric products result in the 
imposition of sanctions, both 
administrative sanctions and criminal 
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sanctions depending on the violations 
committed. The government has regulated 
administrative sanctions for these 
violations in the Customs Law and is 
further regulated in Government 
Regulation No. 39 of 2019 concerning the 
Imposition of Administrative Sanctions in 
the form of Fines in the Customs Sector. 
Tax evasion is intentional illegal 
behavior that leads to violations of tax law 
to avoid paying taxes according to Réthi 
(2012) in Khlif & Achek (2015). Sandmo 
(2005) also argues that tax evasion is a 
violation of tax law where taxpayers 
refrain from reporting income that is 
taxable in principle. Thus tax evasion 
represents a deliberate fraud on the tax 
information that is by the way not to 
report financial assets, the taxable income 
and profit as well as trade mispricing 
(Khlif & Achek, 2015) 
This study aims to analyze empirically 
whether this fight tax evasion (tax 
evasion) by not reporting tax obligations 
are actually on imports of fabric products 
have a correlation with the 
implementation of Safeguard Measures 
Import Duty on fabric products and 
whether the administrative sanction 
customs imposed correlated with tax 
evasion. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 International Trade Theory 
In the theory of international trade 
formulated by Eli Hekscher and Bertil 
Ohlin and later better known as the 
Hekscher-Ohlin theorem, it is explained 
that a country will produce goods that use 
abundant production factors and use them 
intensively (Morrow, 2010). 
China is a country that has an 
abundance in production factors in the 
form of labor and raw materials that are 
available in abundance and cheap which 
can make China have a comparative 
advantage in the global competition for 
world fabrics and make China the largest 
producer and exporter of textile products 
in the world (Yuan & Xu, 2007), so it is 
necessary to carry out an analysis of 
Indonesia's interests as a consideration in 
policymaking to create a win-win solution 
between the two. 
2.2 Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is one form of tax non-
compliance other than tax 
avoidance. According to Kay (1980) 
in Yitzhaki (1974), the thing that 
distinguishes the most between the two is 
that tax evasion tries to manipulate 
transactions illegally, while tax 
avoidance recognizes transactions legally 
but is regulated in such a way as to cause 
tax treatment to be different from 
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what the tax provisions should be 
intended for. . Tax non-compliance itself 
is defined as the failure of taxpayers to 
fulfill their tax obligations regardless of 
whether this was done intentionally or 
unintentionally James & Alley 
(2009). According to Hasseldine & Li 
(1999) the tax evasion action carried out 
by the importer can be explained by using 
the economic deterrence model 
approach. The economic 
deterrence model departs from 
the deterrence theory and the expected 
utility theory which predicts that the tax 
evasion behavior by taxpayers will tend 
to be greater if the economic benefits from 
the tax evasion are greater than the costs 
that must be borne if the tax the 
evasion was caught and subject to 
punishment.     
Allingham & Sandmo (1972) found 
that tax evasion is closely correlated with 
the probability of detection of the tax 
evasion, the tax rate itself, and the number 
of fines that will be imposed if the tax 
evasion efforts are known by the tax 
authorities. Fisman & Wei (2004) in their 
research that analyzes the relationship 
between tax rates and tax evasion in 
imports between China and Hong Kong, 
concludes that every 1% increase in tax 
rate is associated with a 3% increase in tax 
evasion, besides that the evasion gap has 
a negative correlation with the tax rate on 
goods. closely related goods which 
indicate that tax evasion occurs through 
the misclassification of imported goods 
from goods with high tax categories to 
low tax categories as well as through 
reporting the value of imports below the 
actual value. Park & Hyun 
(2003) concluded that the level of audit 
and level of sanctions are important 
factors in preventing tax 
evasion, however, based on experiments 
conducted, the imposition of sanctions is 
more effective in preventing tax 
evasion behavior. 
Gemmell & Hasseldine (2012) tried to 
conclude the tax evasion measurement 
method based on various literature in 
circulation and describe it into two groups 
of approaches, namely the micro approach 
and the macro approach. 
The micro approach is a direct 
approach in measuring tax evasion. This 
approach tries to measure lost taxes or 
unreported income. One example of this 
approach is the audit method used by the 
United States Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) in the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program in 1963-
1988. Apart from the audit method, the 
survey method is also a micro approach in 
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measuring the determinants of tax 
evasion, such as research conducted 
by Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), Richardson 
(2006), and Tsakumis et al. (2007). The 
macro approach according to Gemmell & 
Hasseldine (2012) uses estimates from 
the hidden economy, the method used 
includes the discrepancy method which 
compares the reported income data with 
independent measurements of 
trusted income including hidden income, 
then the single indicator method which 
assumes a direct relationship 
between hidden sizes, income with other 
variables such as labor participation, 
transactions, currency, and electricity use, 
the last method is the multiple indicator 
multiple cause (MIMIC) method. 
2.3 Safeguard Duty 
Safeguard duty or also known as 
safeguards measure, is a provision 
determined by the World Trade 
Organization through GATT Article XIX 
as a tool that can be used by the state if it 
is industrial domestic sector proved to be 
seriously affected as a result of the surge 
in imports, provisions this was adopted by 
the government through Government 
Regulation No. 34 of 2011 on 
Antidumping Measures, Countervailing 
Measures, and Safeguard Measures. 
According to the Government Regulation, 
security measures are defined as actions 
taken by the government to recover 
serious losses or prevent the threat of 
serious losses suffered by the domestic 
industry as a result of a surge in the 
number of imported good either 
absolutely or relatively to similar goods or 
goods that directly compete with imported 
goods. 
In general safeguard duty is Additional 
Import Duty outside of General Import 
Duty, with specific tariff which varies 
from Rp1.318/meter – Rp11.426/meter of 
fabric imported, depending on 
classification. 
In Indonesia, safeguard duty and 
import tax is levied by The Directorat 
General of Customs and Excise under The 
Ministry of Finance. Importer has to 
declare and pay the import duty and 
import tax by themselves upon arrival, 
import duty is the amount of general 
import duty and additional import duty (if 
any), the value of the goods is determined 
using CIF incoterm which consists of cost 
or goods value, freight, and insurance 
multiplied by exchange rate during the 
date of import, resulting in the customs 
value. Customs value plus import duty is 
then called import value which becomes 
the basis of determining import tax. 
Import tax consists of import income tax 
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and value-added tax. 
2.4 Previous Research  
Research on tax evasion has been 
carried out with various independent 
variables and various levels such as the 
level of transactions between 
countries. Allingham & Sandmo 
(1972) concluded that probability of 
detection, tariff rates, and penalties are 
closely related to tax 
evasion behavior. Richardson (2006) in 
his research, which took a sample of 45 
countries, concluded that the most 
dominant factor affecting tax evasion is 
non-economic factors, namely 
complexity, other than that other factors 
that have a significant effect are the source 
of income, education level, tax fairness, 
and tax morale. Fisman & 
Wei (2004) examined various import tax 
rates in China and found that tax 
evasion is closely related to the tax 
rates imposed by China, confirming the 
loss of higher taxes on products with high 
import taxes. Miskam et al. (2013) who 
examined the relationship between tax 
evasion and motor vehicle excise rates in 
motor vehicle smuggling cases in 
Malaysia found that the tariff and penalty 
factors were positively correlated while 
the firm size factor had a negative 
correlation with tax evasion. Park & Hyun 
(2003) use an experimental approach in 
determining the determinants of tax 
evasion and empirically conclude that 
taxpayers have the same level of 
compliance regardless of income level, 
both the audit level and the sanction level 
are very important tools to prevent tax 
evasion but the imposition of sanctions is 
found. more effectively, the three 
taxpayers tend to become free riders in 
financing the government, the fourth tax 
education is a very effective tool so that 
taxpayers are more obedient. 
 From Indonesia itself, research on the 
topic of tax evasion mostly uses a micro 
approach with survey methods with 
varying results, such as Ardyaksa & 
Kiswanto (2014) which concluded that the 
accuracy of the allocation of expenditures, 
taxation technology, and information has 
a negative effect on tax 
evasion. Suminarsasi & Supriyadi (2012) 
found that the taxation system has a 
positive association with taxpayer ethical 
perceptions, discrimination has a negative 
association with taxpayer ethical 
perceptions and a positive association 
between tax justice and taxpayer ethics 
cannot be proven. Paramita & Budiasih 
(2016) with the same questionnaire 
method found that the taxation system and 
tax justice had a negative effect on 
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taxpayers' perceptions of tax 
evasion behavior while taxation 
technology had no negative effect. 
Concerning tax evasion in the customs 
sector in Indonesia Yubiwini & Patunru 
(2018) estimated the tax evasion based on 
trade data between Indonesia and 
Singapore at the 6-digit Harmonized 
System (HS) classification level and 
found evidence that export figures 
from Singapore were reported to be lower 
at The Directorate General of Customs 
and Excise and embezzlement increases 
along with the increase in import duties. 
3. RESEARCH METHODE 
3.1 Data 
In this study, the data used 
is secondary data obtained from the 
customs and excise service application 
system (CEISA / Customs and Excise 
Information System Automation). The 
data in question is in the form of Tax in the 
Context of Import (PDRI) and BMTP data 
reported by the importer in the Import 
Declaration (PIB), PDRI and BMTP data 
which should be based on the Tariff and 
Customs Value Notification Letter 
(SPTNP), HS Code of imported goods, 
tariffs. BMTP imposed, administrative 
sanctions imposed and company asset 
data. Data collection procedures that will 
be carried out in this study are the method 
of documentation and literature study. 
 
3.2 Research Variables and 
Operational Variables 
This study, using three variables, 
namely the dependent variable, the 
independent variable, and the control 
variable. The dependent variable of this 
study is stated as the tax evasion while the 
independent variable consists of BMTP 
and Administrative Sanctions, as the 
control variable company size is used. 
The dependent variable to be 
examined in this study is tax 
evasion (TEV). The concept of tax 
evasion used in this study refers to the 
micro approach methodology in 
measuring tax evasion as described in the 
journal Gemmell & Hasseldine (2012) 
which explains that 
"The micro approach in measuring tax 
evasion is measured based on taxpayer 
data or a survey to identify the extent of 
tax non-compliance or unreported 
income". 
Tax evasion is measured as the 
difference between the tax that should be 
paid based on the inspection by the officer 
and the tax reported divided by the 
customs value, or it can be stated by the 
following formula: 
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The element of import duty is not included 
in the calculation with the consideration of 
differences in the treatment of import 
duties if the exporting country is a country 
that is included in a trade agreement, the 
import duty will be zero, but if there is no 
trade agreement between the two 
countries, the applicable import duty is 
general import duty (MFN).  
The independent variable in this research 
is safeguard duty and administrative 
sanction 
1) Safeguard Duty 
The variable BMTP (BMTP) states the 
number of additional costs that must be 
incurred by importers to import goods that 
have received trade security measures 
based on the Regulation of the Minister of 
Finance. BMTP uses a ratio scale and is 
measured by dividing the total BMTP 
based on the results of an inspection by 
customs officials with the total customs 
value. 
2) Administrative Sanction 
Variable administrative sanctions 
(DENDA) are sanctions imposed for 
violations stipulated in the Customs Law, 
for example failing to convey the number 
and types of goods according to the 
provisions. The administrative sanctions 
variable is stated as the natural logarithm 
of the number of administrative sanctions 
(Miskam et al., 2013)  
3) Control Variable  
This study uses the control variable (SIZE) 
in the form of company size. Miskam et al 
(2013) use the number of employees as a 
proxy for company size, but according to 
Shalit & Sankar (1977) total assets are 
more representative to be used as a proxy 
for company size, therefore in this study, 
the authors use the natural logarithm of 
total assets as a proxy for company size. 
3.4 Research Hypothesis 
Based on the description above the 
authors formulate a hypothesis 
1. H1: Imposition of Safeguard 
Measures Import Duty has a positive 
effect on tax evasion 
2. H2: The imposition of 
administrative sanctions has a negative 
effect on tax evasion 
3.5. Statistic Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are statistics that 
provide data such as frequency, average, 
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and standard deviation which provide 
descriptive information about a data set 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). The 
descriptive statistical analysis aims to 
provide an overview for researchers about 
the state or status of phenomena related to 
research problems based on the data 
collected (Budiwanto, 2017). The analysis 
was carried out by using the classical 
assumption test, normality test, 
multicollinearity test, and heteroscedastic 
test. 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Classical Assumption Testing 
 The results of the normality test show 
















0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
BMTP 34
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0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
lnSize 34
8 
0.4884 0.0211 5.79 0.0552 
From the table above, it can be seen that 
the test results show that all variables show 
an abnormal residual distribution. This 
can be seen from the Pr (Skewness) and Pr 
(Kurtosis) numbers which all show 
numbers below 0.05. Maulana & Muchtar 
(2018) argue that normality is often not 
fulfilled because data is distorted and data 
conditions are naturally not normally 
distributed. 
              Regarding the relationship 
between residual normality and the 
number of observations, there is a theorem 
called the Central Limit Theorema (CLT) 
which states that research conducted with 
a large number of observations does not 
need to question normality, this is because 
the normality test only plays an important 
role when the number of observations is 
small (Kwak & Kim, 2017). Gujarati & 
Porter (2009) say that the number of 
observations in a study can be said to be 
large if the number of observations (n) is 
more than 100. The number of 
observations in this study is 348 
observations, so according to CLT, the 
residual distribution in this study can be 
considered normal even though the results 
of the skewness- test kurtosis show the 
test results are not normally distributed. 
The multicollinearity test results are as 
follows 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
intercept 342.28 0.002922 
lnDenda 224.51 0.004454 
lnSize 142.67 0.007009 
BMTP 1.08 0.925237 
Mean VIF 177.64 
 
 
Jurnal Perspektif Bea dan Cukai                            89                                                                                    
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2021 
 
 
ISSN 2614-283X (online) / ISSN 2620-6757 (print)  
Copyright © 2021, Politeknik Keuangan Negara STAN. All Rights Reserved  
Based on the above results and compared 
with the standard parameters for the VIF 
test, it can be seen that the lnSIZE and 
lnDENDA variables experience 
multicollinearity problems, while the 
BMTP variable is free from 
multicollinearity problems. Therefore, 
a centering technique was carried out on 
the lnDENDA and lnSIZE variables to 
solve this problem. After centering the 
VIF test was carried out again on all 
variables and the results are shown in the 
table below: 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BMTP 1.08 0.925237 
intercept 1.08 0.926612 
lnDENDAC 1.01 0.994200 
lnSIZEC 1.00 0.995361 
Mean VIF 1.04 
 
 
 After the centering technique was 
carried out, the STATA application 
embedded an additional C behind 
the centering variable so that the 
lnDENDA variable became lnDENDAC 
and lnSIZE became lnSIZEC. There was a 
significant change in the VIF and 1 / VIF 
values of the lnDENDAC and lnSIZEC 
variables when compared before 
the centering technique was carried 
out. After doing 
the centering technique, the lnDENDAC 
and lnSIZEC variables got the respective 
values of 1, 00 and 1.01 and 1 / VIF 
respectively 0.99442 and 0.9953661 so 
that both of them were free from 
multicollinearity problems. 
 The results of the heteroscedasticity test 
with the Breusch-Pagan test showed the 
following results: 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of TEV 
chi2(1) = 6.27 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0123 
 
The test results show the value 
Prob> chi2 at 0,0123. Because the value of 
Prob> chi2 is less than 0.05, the 
conclusion drawn is that the regression 
model used has a residual variance that is 
not constant or heteroscedastic so it has a 
heteroscedasticity problem. 
       According to Maulana and Muchtar 
(2018) several ways can be taken to 
overcome the heteroscedasticity problem 
such as adding sample data, transforming 
data into logs, ln, rank, and so on, using 
robust options when performing 
regression, using other estimation models 
such as Generalized Least. Square (GLS) 
and use a regression model with ARCH 
order 1. In this study the authors chose to 
use the robust option in performing 
regression, thus the heteroscedasticity 
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problem in the regression model of this 
study can be considered complete. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 After the variables used in this study 
have successfully passed the classical 
assumption test, then hypothesis testing 
can be done using multiple linear 
regression with the OLS approach. The 
regression results show the following 
results:
 
The coefficient of determination 
(R2) shows the number 0.9475, this means 
that 94.75% of the change in the dependent 
variable that tax evasion can be explained 
by the independent variables namely 
Safeguard Duty (BMTP), administrative 
sanctions (Denda) and the size of the 
company (Size) and 5.25% is explained by 
other variables which are not included in 
the object of research in this study. 
Figures Prob> F which features a 
simultaneous significance level of 0.0000 
which means the figures show the overall 
variables used in this study the BMTP, 
administrative sanctions, and measures 
companies simultaneously able to deliver 
a significant influence on tax evasion. 
The partial significance test or also 
known as the t statistical test aims to test 
the effect of each independent variable on 
the dependent. The results of the partial 
significance test are shown in the 
probability column t (P> | t |). The 
explanation of the results of the t statistical 
test is as follows: 
1) The t probability value of the security 
measure import duty (BMTP) variable 
is 0, 0000. This value is smaller than α 
0, 05 so it can be concluded that the 
variable of security measures import 
duty has a significant effect on tax 
evasion.      
2) The t probability value of the 
administrative sanctions variable 
(lnDendaC) shows the number 0.415 
which is greater than α 0 , 05, thus it can 
be concluded that the administrative 
sanctions variable does not have a 
significant effect on tax evasion.      
3) The t probability value of the firm size 
variable (lnSizeC) is 0.014. This value 
is still below the threshold level of 
confidence α 0, 05 so it means that 
company size has a significant effect 
on tax evasion.  
Discussion 
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After OLS regression has been carried out 
through classical assumption testing 
and goodness of fit test, the regression 
equation in this study can be written with 
the coefficients obtained based on the 
regression results as follows: 
 
This equation shows the relationship 
between the independent and dependent 
variables which can be translated as 
follows: 
1)  The variable of security measure 
import duty (BMTP) has a regression 
coefficient of 0, 1010218. This means 
that if other variables are constant, a 
1% increase in import duty security 
measures will have a positive effect on 
the increase in tax evasion by 
0.1010218 or about 10.1%.      
2)  The administrative sanctions variable 
(lnDENDAC) produces a regression 
coefficient of -0.0015009, which 
means that if other variables are 
constant, a 1% increase in 
administrative sanctions will reduce 
the tax evasion by 0.001509 or about 
0.15%.      
3)  The firm size variable (lnSIZEC) 
produces a regression coefficient 
of 0.0018688. This means that if other 
variables are constant, a 1% increase in 
company size will increase the tax 
evasion by 0.0018688 or about 
0.18%.    
Testing of the imposition of import 
duty on safeguard measures on tax evasion 
is proven to have a significant and positive 
effect. This proves that the higher 
the import duty for security measures that 
must be paid by the importer, the higher 
the tax evasion will be carried out. From 
the resulting coefficient, it can be seen that 
a 1% increase in BMTP will have the 
effect of a 10% increase in tax evasion. 
      This finding strengthens various 
previous studies such as research by 
Fisman and Wei (2004) which found a 3% 
correlation in the increase in tax evasion 
from every 1% increase in import duties 
on trade between China and Hong Kong, 
besides that Yousefi et al. (2020) also 
concluded similar findings but slightly 
below that is 2.5% tax evasion for every 
1% increase in import taxes between Iran 
and its 21 trading partner countries, as well 
as Mengistu et al. (2019), found the same 
thing in Ethiopia, even Miskam et al., 
(2013) found The correlation reached 
21.3% increase in tax evasion in the case 
of car smuggling in Malaysia. The 
findings above indicate that the tax 
evasion phenomenon in the customs 
sector, especially smuggling, is a 
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phenomenon that is commonly found in 
various countries, especially 
developing countries (Buehn & 
Farzanegan, 2012). 
Tax evasion carried out by importers 
can be viewed from the economic 
deterrence theory as proposed by 
Hasseldine and Li (1999) which departs 
from the earliest theories regarding tax 
evasion by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). The earliest theories regarding tax 
evasion consider taxpayers to be risk-
neutral decision-makers and try to 
maximize their utility. In this framework, 
the factors that determine the cost of 
compliance include, among others, the tax 
rate, the probability of detection, the level 
of income, and the penalty structure, all of 
which direct how taxpayers behave to 
obey or not. 
 As explained above, the tax evasion 
carried out by importers has a very close 
relationship with the imposition of BMTP 
on fabric products. This BMTP was 
imposed after the surge in imports of 
fabric products from China caused serious 
losses to the domestic industry. The surge 
in fabric products from China is due to 
China being a country with competitive 
advantages in producing fabric products 
Yuan & Xu (2007) so that fabric products 
made in China are cheap and of high 
quality. With the imposition of BMTP, 
imported fabric products will be more 
expensive and it is hoped that the domestic 
fabric product producer industry will have 
the opportunity to catch up in terms of 
production quality and price with imported 
products. 
According to Sheikh (1973) whatever 
causes price discrimination between the 
national and foreign markets of a good, 
this will create an incentive for smuggling, 
so that when the government sets high 
tariffs for importing a good, the price of 
the good will increase which results in 
smugglers. will be motivated to carry out 
smuggling for more profit. The existence 
of this smuggling cannot be separated 
from the interest of the domestic market to 
enjoy the quality and cheap fabric 
products. 
Still, according to Sheikh (1989), the 
demand for smuggled products also 
depends on various factors such as moral 
standards and risk profiles and what is 
equally important is the existence of anti-
smuggling laws besides the difference in 
prices between goods produced 
domestically and imported goods 
produced by the community. feel that the 
benefits obtained from importing illegally 
(tax-evasion / mis invoicing / 
misclassification) are worth the risk so that 
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consumers will seek cheaper prices 
illegally. 
The results of the partial significance 
test show that the imposition of customs 
administration sanctions in the form of 
fines apparently did not contribute 
significantly to reduce tax evasion. This is 
contrary to much of the literature that 
proves that the imposition of sanctions or 
penalties is correlated with a decrease in 
tax evasion (Miskam et al., 2013; Park & 
Hyun, 2003) 
After digging deeper into the data 
obtained by the author, we found the fact 
that most violations are only given 
administrative sanctions in the form of a 
fine with a nominal value of Rp5,000,000. 
This is regulated in Indonesia Customs 
Law No. 10/1995 Article 114 paragraph 1 
and 2 as follow 
All violations which are subject to 
administrative sanctions in the form of 
fines are calculated based on a 
percentage of the import duty, if the 
tariff or final tariff is the zero percent 
for goods related to the violation, then 
against this violation, the offender is 
subject to administrative sanctions in 
the form of a fine of IDR 5,000,000.00.  
After ASEAN and China Free Trade 
Agreement (ACFTA) is ratified, 
practically most of the customs tariffs 
between China and ASEAN become 0%, 
accordingly any related violations for this 
kind of import subject to a fine with a flat 
nominal value of Rp. 5,000,000.00. Apart 
from fines the importer must also pay for 
the shortfall in taxes and duties enter the 
security measures owed based on the 
inspection of the customs official. 
The low nominal sanction is 
suspected to be the main reason why the 
imposition of administrative sanctions has 
not been able to reduce tax evasion, this 
relatively small nominal value makes the 
importer assume that the risk borne 
becomes insignificant when compared to 
the benefits that will be obtained from the 
savings in having to pay taxes and 
safeguard duty. Especially with the 
channeling system in process of importing 
goods into three channels, namely the red, 
yellow and green channels, then the 
importer has more incentive to hide the 
true obligation due to the hope that their 
goods get the green lane so that they are 
not subject to inspection. 
This is in accordance with the opinion 
of Becker (1968) in Raskolnikov (2006) 
which sees that the taxpayer's decision to 
carry out tax evasion is a problem choice 
under uncertainty or can technically be 
called gambling. Taxpayer who knows 
that the tax evasion action he does has the 
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potential to subject to sanctions equal to X 
will compare it with that gain expected if 
the action is successful. This model 
concludes if expected value generated 
from this gambling is positive then the 
taxpayer will do tax evasion, and if it is 
negative then taxpayers will obey its tax 
obligations. 
In the data obtained by the author, it is 
also found that many companies breaking 
more than once during the observation 
period, few companies even violate more 
than five times. This proves that many 
companies didn't take sanctions imposed. 
seriously According to Waerzeggers et al., 
(2019) imposition of fines can become 
ineffective in preventing tax evasion if the 
sanction in the form of a fine is seen as part 
of the tax expense by the taxpayer, 
particularly if the monetary amount is 
from sanctions are not sufficient to be an 
effective deterrent. This is also the case 
with administrative sanctions in this study, 
where the amount of Rp. 5,000,000 has 
been proven in this study there is no 
significant effect in preventing tax evasion 
because the amount is not sufficient to 
prevent tax evasion by importers so that 
importers can consider the sanction only 
as an additional cost to import and tend to 




1) The imposition of customs entry 
security measures positively and 
significantly correlated with the 
increase in tax evasion. The greater 
the import duty for security measures 
imposed, the greater the tax 
evasion carried out by the importer.  
2) The imposition of administrative 
sanctions has no significant effect on 
reducing tax evasion. This can occur 
because the amount of administrative 
sanctions imposed is insignificant to 
cause a deterrence effect on importers 
so that importers can consider 
administrative sanctions imposed as 
part of the cost of importing.   
Researchers who are interested in 
continuing this research can further 
develop hypotheses by including other 
variables such as customs value, then the 
importer's risk profile based on tracking 
and it can also be further investigated 
whether the symptoms of tax evasion also 
occur in goods subject to general import 
duty rates (most favored nation). In 
addition, it is also interesting to have a 
further review regarding 
the implementation of the imposition 
of import duties on this security measure 
from the side of service users, both 
importers and Customs Brokers (PPJK). 
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